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Soviet Railroad Traffic
Statistical Measures
The principal statistical measures of railroad freight traffic for the
Soviet Union are available, or can be approximated from the reported
relationships of available data to other years, for the whole Soviet
period and for the base year 1913, except for some years for which
interpolation has been resorted to in some series. More doubt sur-
rounds the data for the period of World War I and the subsequent
civil war than for the later years before World War II. Scant evidence
is available for the war years, but a relative abundance of material
on the immediate postwar period is available, together with substantial
detail for the last decade.l Moreover, there are difficulties of territorial
coverage, particularly during the revolutionary period, when the effort
to assemble statistics from reports of the several railroad administra-
tions after the event results in gaps as well as doubt on the portion
of traffic covered. Limited significance should be assigned to the data
for 1916-20. At a later period, difficulty is encountered in allowing for
absorption of the lines in eastern Poland because it is impossible
to segregate the Polish railway traffic data for the prewar years. On
the whole, however, the available data give a general view of the
aggregate output of the Soviet rail plant in familiar terms, viz., metric
tons originated, carloadings, and metric ton-kilometers (at least two
of these series are subject to a probable overstatement). In the study
of all series, care should be taken to observe the years when territorial
coverage changes.
The student familiar with Western rail statistics is at once con-
fronted with the necessity of understanding precisely what the Soviet
data purport to show. He must beware of direct comparisons with
Western data which are derived in some instances from different
documentary sources, may be designed to serve somewhat different
purposes, and are compiled under accounting concepts that are
sometimes more rigorously applied and policed. The concept of tons
1Thereader should be cautioned to read with care the introduction to Ap-
pendix C. An effort has been made not only to secure the Soviet statistics, but also
to fill out the series with the most probable estimates in the absence of direct
Soviet data.As will appear, the statistics, even when available, frequently mis-
represent the facts or differ in concept or in coverage from U.S. series which are
nominally similar.
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originated does not appear to differ from that employed in this country,
except that double counting does not seem to be positively avoided in
the case of tonnage first loaded on rail cars, subsequently transferred
to a water haul, and later reloaded on railroads. The Soviet literature
appears to contain little discussion of such rail-water-rail movements,
but it is apparent that, although a certain amount of such traffic existed
on river and maritime routes in the early 1930's, efforts to stimulate
these joint hauls have not been as successful as desired and they repre-
sent very small tonnages in relation to total rail freight.Similarly,
the carloadings appear to be analogous to those compiled by the
Association of American Railroads rather than those published by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The latter refer to carload traffic
only (including forwarder traffic)and treat through rail-water-rail
movements as though they were continuous carload movements, which
are represented by a single car count at the initial rail origin. One
difference between the Soviet system and that of the Association of
American Railroads is that cars received from connecting lines of
other countries are recorded as carloadings in the USSR. This is
believed to represent a relatively small element, but to the extent that
it exists it tends to overstate Soviet loadings in comparison with those
of the United States, especially for recent years.2 Volumes of traffic
between the USSR and the satellites to its west as well as Red China
have
.certainlygrown considerably.
The Soviet carloading data are, however, given in two-axle units
rather than in actual cars since the mixed fleet composed of two-axle
and four-axle cars requires a common denominator.8 Moreover, tank
cars are weighted by nominal weight capacity on a scale which dis-
regards the actual number of axles in cars of more than two axles.
Thus, up to nineteen tons capacity, they are counted as one con-
ventional unit, twenty to twenty-five tons as two such units, twenty-six
to forty tons as three, and over forty tons as four. Hence Soviet load-
same lack of comparability probably exists for the data on tons originated.
It was reported in late 1959 that traffic between Eastern Europe and China across
the USSR is now a complicating factor.
8 Like railroads in other parts of the world, the Soviet system has a few heavy-
duty cars carried on more than four axles for oversize and exceptionally heavy
single-piece shipments.Some three-quarters of the Soviet cars are now four-axle
ones, largely of design similar to some common in the United States in the late
1920's.The European type of two-axle car still makes a substantial contribution
to Soviet rail traffic performance not only because of its number, but also because
it is adaptable to small carload shipments, and hence it is not to be regarded as
entirely obsolete.Moreover, the two-axle car usually has greater cubic, in corn-
parison to weight, capacity than four-axle cars—a factor which helps attain a high
load factor with this type of equipment.
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as reported should be reduced by one-half to secure a series
roughly comparable to that of the Association of American Railroads
for the United States. It is further to be noted that the Soviet system
reports average daily carloadings, whereas the custom in the United
Statesisto report aggregate carloadings weekly, quarterly, and
annually.
A less obvious, but more important, difference must be noted in
the ton-kilometer data. As ton-kilometers reflect both the tonnage
loaded and the distance over which it is moved, they afford the best
measure of a carrier's freight traffic performance. Moreover, in view
of the transfers from one type of transport to another which give rise
to duplications in tons originated data—each form of transport treating
the traffic as originated when received even though delivered by a
connecting carrier of another type—ton-kilometers alone can be aggre-
gated to secure a measure of the complete freight traffic output of
a transport system. The Soviet system reports two series for ton-
kilometers. One, which they call "tariff" ton-kilometers, is more reg-
ularly reported in absolute figures in Soviet publications. The second,
which they call "operating," purports to be actual ton-kilometers.4
Tariff ton-kilometers are not a direct measure of the physical work
produced by the railroad system. In effect they record the ton-kilo-
meters that would have been produced had the traffic in all instances
moved over the short tariff routes or the routes approved for plan
purposes.5 They do not record the ton-kilometers produced when
traffic actually moves over routes other than the short tariff or plan
routes.
41t is hoped that the tariff series is a homogeneous one, representing tariff ton-
kilometers computed from originated waybills (waybills at the point of issuance).
But it appears probable that terminated waybills (waybills received at destination
stations representing completed shipments)are used in the postwar period.An
alternative system records short tariff distances between each junction stamp on
the terminated waybill.For any given time period, there is a different population
of waybills employed in these two computations.The terminated bills are ap-
parently used for division of revenues among the several railroads.Alternatively
these two statistics may be called "revenue" and "performed," respectively.
5Thesedata are compiled from the freight waybills on which the station agent
at origin enters the tariff distance (the shortest physical route regardless of prac-
ticability as shown in Tariff Handbook No. 4 via prescribed or approved junction
points between railroads).Junction points for routing purposes may be altered
in successive semiannual plans for the making of trains or by order of the ministry.
Internal routing on any railroad may differ from the mileage entered on the
waybill.On certain routes terminal arbitraries(distances arbitrarily established
regardless of the actual distances) are employed, as in the case of Moscow where
fIfty-four kilometers are added to all through routes representing one-half the length
of the belt line (Kratkii tekhnicheskii zheleznodorozhnyi slovar' [Brief Technical
Railroad Dictionary], Moscow, 1946, p. 507).
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The United States statistics show the ton-mileage actually performed
over the route of movement. Moreover, the Soviet concept of a short
tariff route does not exactly correspond to the similar concept in the
United States as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in
prescribing rate scales. Our rate-making distances are not necessarily
the shortest routes over which traffic can be moved without transfer
of lading, although they tend to approximate such distances. Regard-
less of changes in actual routing practices, these rate-making distances
remain undisturbed except by changes in the physical plant. The
Soviet tariff distance, however, purports to represent the shortest route
between any two points over which traffic can be worked via the
specified junctions. The relative simplicity of the Soviet system of
lines, as well as its organization into regional groups of lines, eliminates
the problem of a variety of competing multiline routes.Insofar as
the tariff ton-kilometers are computed from the originated waybills
in a given time, in a period of expanding traffic they tend to overstate
the annual ton-kilometers by as much as three to four days' traffic..6
A second difficulty, which applies to both the Soviet ton-kilometer
series, is that they include company material moved in "commercial"
trains, though they exclude the movement of such material in non-
revenue trains.Hence they are not comparable with the revenue
ton-mile series for United States roads, nor are they quite comparable
with our net ton-miles, revenue and nonrevenue. This last fact results,
however, from different relationships in the movement of company
material in work and special trains, the Soviet system having a rela-
tively larger movement in such trains. The nearest comparison is,
therefore, with our revenue and nonrevenue net ton-miles, and for
most purposes this will suffice.7It should be noted, however, that
since it has not been possible to separate out the company material
6U.s.railroads formerly used the waybill method for computing ton-miles, but
because of the resulting overlap and the delays pending a closing out of interline
waybills, the use of conductors' wheel reports was required by the U.S. railroad
administration during the first war (see J. L. White, Analysis of Railway Operations,
2nd ed., New York, 1946, pp. 229 if).This had the effect of recording in any
period the ton-miles actually performed in train service.Most American railroads
maintain their revenue accounts, however, on a received basis (see E. H. Bunnell,
Railroad Accounting and Statistics, Chicago, 1955, p. 34).
7Certainminor differences no doubt result from a lack of common treatment.
Thus Item 63 in Rail Form A, annual report to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, includes a proportion of the weight of exclusive work equipment based on the
relationship of net ton-miles to gross ton-miles for the reporting period, a wholly
arbitrary inclusion.The same item includes water transfer service on the Great
Lakes involving a rail-line haul, the revenue from which is includible in Account
No. 101. We are unable to ascertain in similar detail the specific content of the
Soviet series.
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from the Soviet series, this series includes not only the traffic hauled
for shippers, but also most of the tonnage hauled for the maintenance,
construction, and working of the railroads, and should not be mis-
takenly compared with the revenue ton-miles of U.S. roads. Since the
Soviet system until recently has operated primarily on steam (which
requires much larger tonnages of fuel than does diesel power for an
equivalent performance), since the state of its locomotive technology
must result in a rather high consumption of coal per thousand gross
ton-kilometers, and since the haul of company material undoubtedly
averages longer than that in the United States, a larger proportion
of the ton-kilometers no doubt represents traffic required to meet the
needs of the railroads themselves than is the case in the United States.
We have been able to develop a less complete and a much less certain
series for operating ton-kilometers. Were the series as soundly based
on published Soviet data as the tariff ton-kilometer series, and were the
Soviet data based upon documents as well supervised as our conductors'
wheel reports, it would certainly afford the most accurate measure of
the actual physical work of the Soviet railway system. For it is derived
from engineers' trip reports which purport to show actual net ton-
kilometrage, including the differences between the route of movement
and the tariff route and between actual origin or destination and the
nearest agency station from or to which the traffic is billed. Hence it
corresponds in concept closely to our net ton-miles, revenue and non-
revenue, and is derived from a similar primary document. Unhappily a
wide variety of evidence suggests frequent falsification of engineers'
trip reports in the direction of overstatement.8 As the disparity be-
tween the two ton-kilometer series has been rather steadily reduced
and now is of the order of 1 per cent, it may be that these inaccuracies
have been brought under control. Direct data are available for 1930-38
and 1940. The relationship of operating to tariff ton-kilometers is
given for certain other years and permits a direct computation. Since
a great effort is made to reduce the disparity between the two series—
the excess of operating over tariff ton-kilometers being commonly
regarded by Soviet administrators as "wasteful" transportation—the
movement upward or downward in particular years is frequently given
8Auditpractices appear to be loose.Crews have incentives to overstate the
tonnage of trains in order to overstate gross ton-kilometers and thus benefit from
the premiums paid for fuel economy.Instances are recorded of the train tonnage
being reported separately in total by each engineer of a double-headed train.
Gudok, the newspaper of the Ministry of Transportation, from time to time cites
such cases which probably are but samples of a widespread practice.Kochetov
attributes some of the excess of operating ton-kilometerstoengineers' over-
statement of tonnage.
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in percentages.° The use of percentage relationships so far removed
from the desired datum of course introduces large possibility of error
in the result. Interpolation has also been necessary to fill out the series.
The question arises, in connection with the traffic statistics, whether
the pressures which assail Soviet shipping industries and Soviet railroad
administrators may result in misrepresentation which produces an
upward bias. This is a particularly vital question because of the useful-
ness of accurate traffic statistics as a measure of economic growth. No
entirely satisfactory answer has been obtained and in the end it is
necessary to rely on judgment in appraising probable reliability.
We are inclined to regard the tariff ton-kilometers as a reasonably
accurate representation of the facts which they purport to convey,
subject to a moderate upward bias which we are unable to estimate
since Soviet authorities themselves are unable to put a value upon
jt.10It has been suggested that the billed tonnage may exceed that
actually loaded in view of the emphasis placed upon heavy carloading
and the penalties which may be brought to bear on shippers for the
misuse of rolling stock, and this suggestion appears to have merit.
The high performance recorded for average carload and average car
turnaround between loads tends to support this view. Perhaps the
tendency merely counteracts the tendency, present in all countries, to
underbill in order to reduce charges, but the tenor of official statements
suggests a considerable lack of concern about freight charges on the
part of Soviet industry.
The quarterly plan procedure, with its monthly breakdown, repre-
sents a cooperative endeavor between shipping ministries and the
Ministry of Transportation and its railroad administrations to establish
norms for static carload which govern the supply of cars to individual
shipping installations. To be sure, there is evidence of negligence in
plan enforcement as well as in the planning processitself, but
nevertheless the plan must have some influence. Moreover, the loading
norms for various commodities appear to be well adjusted to the
loading capacities of cars and are, in this sense, practical. Yet penalties
9 Some of the disparity is, of course, unavoidable. Overemphasis on the short
routing of traffic may 'also result in congestion of the direct lines and in less
efficient use of equipment where the movement is slower or faces greater physical
obstacles than via less direct routes.Little attention appears tO be given to these
factors which influence much internal routing in the United States, although they
undoubtedly affect daily operation.Soviet analysts are aware of them, but the
overemphasis of simple objectives on occasion encourages inefficiency.
10 As will appear, there are numerous instances of bias in the Soviet statistics
which tend to reinforce one another and the recognition of which promotes a better
understanding of rail performance, even though the degree of bias cannot be
determined.
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for ordering more cars than can be loaded are relatively low, while
the pressures to be certain of an adequate car supply are great. Over-
ordering of cars appears to be a fairly common phenomenon which
provides both opportunities and incentives for light loading and over-
billing to conceal this departure from efficient practice.
We have discovered no Soviet equivalent of the weighing and
inspection bureau or of other checks on the accuracy of shippers'
scale weights and billed weights. Reliance seems to be put primarily
on weighmasters and station agents. An annual sample weighing of
some 300,000 cars is made at check points. Industry scales under the
supervision of railroad test forces appear to exist very rarely and the
evidence suggests that a great part of Soviet rail traffic is billed and
moves without a scale weight being taken. Much bulk traffic moves
on estimated weights derived from a rough approximation of the
cubic space occupied multiplied by the average weight of the com-
modity per cubic meter.Visual inspection of open-top cars thus
loaded provides a rough check on whether they are well or lightly
loaded, but can be highly deceptive when a wide range of commodities
is involved and when the inspection is made at different points in
transit.1' In any event, the results of the sample weight checks clis-
close a consistent overstatement of actual weight in the billed weight
from which statistics are compiled. The degree of overstatement is
reported to average from one-half to three tons per car.
Given an overstatement of tonnage in the waybills, not only tons
originated but also tariff ton-kilometers are overstated. There seems
to be little likelihood of consistent or important overstatement of
tariff distances since the compilation from destination waybills, on
which the route is recorded by stamps at origin stations, junctions,
and destination stations, affords an audit check on proper application
of the published table of shortline distances. In most respects, however,
the internal audit system has not been investigated.Elsewhere we
will discuss the evidence available from the operating statistics which
lends credence to the recorded traffic performance.
Growth of Soviet Rail Freight Traffic
The Soviet railroads began to show firm signs of recuperation from
war and revolutionary conditions in the fiscal year 1922/23, but it was
not until 1928, after steady growth, that the 1916 volume was exceeded.
11Loadsof coal and other bulk commodities tend to consolidate after they have
been in motion for some time and appear less well loaded at destination than at
origin.
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Contemporary accounts by foreign observers record both the dis-
organization prevalent in 1921 and the slow steps toward recupera.
tjon,12 which took effect with more firm administration in 1923,13
although physical rehabilitation presented problems which could only
be coped with gradually and required substantial import of technical
personnel, motive power, rolling stock, and other equipment.'4 This
importation has had lasting effects on Soviet railroad technology and
operating practices and may well account, in lieu of the designed
initiative of the Soviets, for the adoption of features characteristic of
U.S. technology. The Soviet discussions refer to their policy, however,
as an effort to adopt the best of West European and United States
practices. This appears to be largely a rationalization for the long
continuance of a mixed technology, although some arguments can
be found for continuing in service a proportion of European-type
equipment.15
An annual growth of 20 billion ton-kilometers after 1928 slowed
down in 1932 and came to a halt in 1933, producing the "transportation
crisis" of the early 19B0's which has been the object of considerable
attention by analysts in the English-speaking world. Retardation of
the rate of growth, of course, accompanied the fairly steady absolute
growth in the late 1920's and in 1930 and 1931. Equipment importa-
tions, except to secure the benefit of foreign technological develop-
ments, had largely stopped after 1931, while domestic equipment
production was undergoing considerable expansion, although falling
short of plan. As Holland Hunter demonstrates, however, the share
of railroad investment in total investment declined substantially under
the First Five Year Plan by comparison with the late 1920's.16 This
12Seethe report of the American Relief Administration quoted in Railway Age,
Vol. 72, 1922, p. 92, and the account of Captain Geofrey L. Carden in Railway Age,
Vol. 74, 1923, p. 72 if.
28SidneyBrooks.supplies an account of the beginnings of recuperation in Railway
Age, Vol. 76, 1924, p. 129 if.
14Mr.Ralph Budd, subsequently president of the Burlington System and dean
of American railroad presidents, actively headed the study of Soviet requirements
and the planning which lead to recommendations by his mission for rehabilitation
and expansion. A strong German influence is also apparent, reinforced by a con-
siderable import of motive power and other material manufactured in Germany.
15Druckermakes the point, important in considering the significance of the
Soviet experience for underdeveloped countries, that the USSR inherited a good
transportation system.Notwithstanding the inability to support the mass mili-
tary operations of World War I, this is, of course, true. The problem of the 1920's
was one of rehabilitation of a system of considerable size which had once been well
equipped. See Peter F. Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow, New York, 1959, p. 169.
16HollandHunter, Soviet Transportation Policy, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 54
and 71.
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limitation of investment apparently affected all phases of rail plant
and not merely motive power and rolling stock.
In the development of the First Five Year Plan, which was launched
in the fall of 1928, it is clear that considerable attention was paid to
the relation transportation development should bear to the industrial-
ization program. The background is admirably treated elsewhere and
need not be repeated here17 but we may be permitted a few comments
upon strands of policy which, modified to cope with events, have
persisted to the present day. As Hunter points out: "Received Soviet
doctrine sees only that transportation diverts resources from pro-
ducing output." The planning work and the published discussion—
then more free than at later periods—of both the State Planning Com-
mission and the Commissariat of Means of Communication are similar
to those in the Western world during times of war pressure. The
relation of transportation to industrialization as a whole set forth for
the First Five Year Plan is characteristic of not only Soviet planning,
though it has not been carried to similar extremes elsewhere, nor has it
been extended to become parts of long-term policy elsewhere. Nowhere
has it been adopted, either, when the basic plant was already weak for
the job to be done or where such a large, continuing expansion of the
needs of the economy was anticipated. In both the Soviet Union and
the Western world the same arguments are advanced in wartime:
rationalizing industrial locations and their supply, minimizing hauls
in distribution, and intensifying the utilization of physical plant. The
Soviet planners talk like the officials of a war production agency which
is bent upon securing the utmost conservation of resources in such
services as transportation in order that resources may be freed for
other purposes which are viewed as more vital for immediate objectives.
But the propositions, which in a Western country in wartime may be
viewed as a temporary stretching of a basically adequate and somewhat
elastic transportation capacity, become in the Soviet Union relatively
permanent attitudes. In both cases they trade heavily upon theoretical
technical possibilities but overlook the imperfections of the human
tools and the motives that detract from maximum physical efficiency.
Yet the Soviet administration was successful in one instance in clearing
up a shortage of transport and restoring a modest traffic growth with
limited help from increased physical plant in late 1933 and 1934. The
restoration of a reasonable equilibrium with growth in the industrial




During rapid industrialization the same conflict of demand for
scarce resources becomes strategic as in war. A calculated risk is
required, otherwise the heavy demands for steel and machinery for
a similar, percentage growth in the railroad, system will tend to defeat
the major objective of timing. This is particularly true in the case
of the expansion of heavy industry,, for the primary requirements of
railroads are for the, heavy structurals, castings; and. forgings whose
production capacity is limited and which are much in demand for
the expansion of the manufacturing plant, including the steel industry
itself.'8 A certain myopia pervades the planners in transport matters,
theoretical efficiencies are treated as if they were actual, and the ex-
perienced transport operating officials are viewed as hopelessly con-
servative to the point of obstructivism. As a spur these attitudes are,
no doubt, useful but when allowed full force in determining investment
they may result in unexpected failures. The remarkable flexibility of
a railroad system in the absence of interrailroad competition and com-
mercial objectives and under strict discipline has been demonstrated
in more than one country and on many occasions. But the Soviet
planners may have cut too fine, although the reasons for the inadequate
transport in 1930-34 also included the fact that the plan for output
and delivery of major items of transport equipment was not fulfilled
and that traffic demands increased more than anticipated. The average
haul notably failed to respond to the prescribed treatment and in-
creased with some promptness rather than falling. Nor is it clear
that a wise distinction was made between the demands imposed upon
motive power and rolling stock by an increase in tonnage originated
as distinct from an increase in ton-mileage resulting from. an increase
in the average haul. An equivalent increase in ton-mileage from the
latter cause is cOnducive to improved equipment utilization and makes
proportionately less demand for railroad plant expansion, except for
main-line capacity. Even if length of haul had been held within the
planned limits, it is doubtful that the proposed expansion of rolling
stock would have been adequate to cope with the expected tonnage
originated.. S , .
Theevidence from the Soviet statistics is not clear-cut, yet it bears
some of the marks of congestion as the proximate. cause of shortage
of cars fOr loading. The growth of operating ton-kilometers slowed
down before 1932. In 1933 ton-kilometers fell off slightly (see series
C-6 in Appendix C). Carloadings likewise fell in 1933 after a very
18Caremust be taken to work out requirements and availabilities in a shape and
form breakdown if a correct appraisal of a railroad program is to be secured..
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modest growth in the preceding year (see series C-4). Average carload
appears to have held rather steady, except for a slight dip in 1932
(series C-5) ,andtons originated were virtually the same in 1933 as
in the preceding year. Increase in the length of. haul ceased in 1933.
The backlog of unshipped freight was reported at 20 million tons at
the end of 1932 and stood at the same level at the close of 1933. By
•the end of 1934 a reduction to 15 million tons had been effected.'9
It would appear that the car shortage, which was the immediate
manifestation of inadequate transportation, was produced by a growing
difficulty in the movement of cars through yards and terminals and
on the line. Of course, it is possible that, had circulation been as free
as in earlier years, car shortages would have developed from other
causes, notably from the failure of investment in rolling stock to
keep pace with the growth of traffic demand.
Available monthly data for 1983 show that the greater part of the
difficulty was concentrated in the winter and early summer. An im-
provement occurred in the late spring, and the fall performance
exceeded the comparable period of 1982, as can be seen from Table 7.
TABLE 7














SOURCE: I. V. Kochetov, Statistika zheleznodorozhnoi transporta [Statisticsof Rail-
road Transportation}, Moscow, 1941, p. 61;Socialist COnstruction in the USSR;
Moscow, 1936,p. 340.
Thusit would appear that severe winter conditions may have
impeded operations in the early months of the year and contributed
to a congestion which was difficult to clear up. There is some evidence
to suggest that maintenance standards had deteriorated to the point
of having an adverse effect upon. operations. Thus there appears to
19 See Hunter, Soviet Transportation) pp. 52-54, for a more extended account.
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be an increase in accidents both on the line and in yards. Line-haul
movement slowed down primarily from a drop in running speed
between terminals, suggesting that poor standards of line and locO-
motive maintenance, as well as, perhaps, poorer quality of fuel, may
have been contributing factors. This view is somewhat reinforced by
the modest decline in gross trainload. Operating personnel declined
in number somewhat and it is possible that an increase in crew over-
time contributed to declining performance. Quite possibly the con-
sequences of neglect beyond mere limitations of capital investments
were being felt.
Certain other features of the 1933 performance are worth comment.
Tariff ton-kilometers showed a small increase in 1933 and the excess
of operating over tariff ton-kilometers grew from 4.25 per cent in 1933
to 5.67 per cent in 1934, perhaps an indication of increased line-haul
congestion. Empty car-mileage evidently grew by nearly 10 per cent
between these two years, a phenomenon contrary to that expected
under heavy traffic pressure in competitive systems, but which can
perhaps be explained by efforts to relocate cars and to give priority to
certain traffic in car placement(see series C-33).Centralized dis-
tribution of empties by the Ministry of Transportation for so wide-
spread a rail system need not be expected to work as the car service
rules do on American railroads. Arbitrary car relocation here never
affects more than a very minor portion of the supply. Both freight
car and locomotive turnaround were more sluggish in 1933, thus
depriving the plant of a capacity equivalent to its output in the
previous year.20 And this weakening of rail performance occurred
in the face of some increase in the volume of traffic, a circumstance
which is usually favorable to increased operating efficiency.2'
By studying the growth of freight backlogs, Hunter attempts to
appraise the inadequacy of rail transport during this critical period.22
From the available data it does not appear that there was a major
pile-up of unshipped freight, although substantial tonnages were
awaiting transportation and the volume reached a peak in 1933. How-
20Bothtrainspeed and locomotive-kilometers per locomotive-day declined.
indicating a slowing down of line-haul performance without, however, giving any
direct clue to reasons. This plus the increased haul of empty cars was probably
more influential in the lengthened freight car turnaround than deficiencies in the
shipping ministries in loading and unloading cars.The composition of car
turnaround does not show a growth in the time required for loading and unloading,
but there is some doubt as to the reliability of these data.
21Theyear 1939 was, however, a poor one for heavy industry.The marked
renewedrise in heavy industrial output occurred in the following year.
22Hunter,Soviet Transportation, pp. 59-60.
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ever, this approach runs the risk of understatement. Many types of
industry lack ample or expandable storage prior to transportation in
the Soviet economy as in others.It would be interesting to know
whether any stoppage of production or slowing down of production
occurred in consequence and to appraise its significance. There is some
evidence pointing in this direction, though a quantitative analysis is
impossible from the data at hand. It is apparent, however, that the
shortage of transport was taken extremely seriously at top govern-
ment levels in the Soviet Union. It is also apparent that the measures
taken were highly effective since they were applied to a rail system
which for some time had been laboring close to the limits of its
capacity.
The year 1934, if the statistics are to be believed, saw an increase
in tons originated which had been equaled only once before—in the
increase of 1930 over 1929—while the average haul resumed its in-
crease. In consequence, operating ton-kilometers increased by 23 per
cent, building upon the recovery of the late months of the preceding
year.Sharp improvements in the operating indexes occurred and
appear to bear the major responsibility for improved traffic per-
formance at this stage of the crisis. In 1934 the Soviet railroads, accord-
ing to the statistical record, tightened their operating performance,
and it is clear that the shipping ministries, goaded by officials from
Stalin on down, cooperated in a more effective fashion. Although
unshipped backlogs remained at the end of 1934, the crisis was in good
part broken before significant relief could be secured from increased
materials allocations and their embodiment in additional line and
yard capacity, motive power, and cars.23 Thus average Static carload
increased 8.7 per cent in one year24 and car turnaround time decreased
by 8.5 per cent.25 Locomotive-kilometers per active freight locomotive-
day showed a modest increase and reached a new high. And average
freight trainload increased significantly. Unhappily it is impossible—
in the light of the statistical deceptions known to be inherent in the
reporting system of the Soviet railroads, known changes in reporting
concepts at various times, and the general looseness of statistical con-
23Asnoted below, there is evidence of some increase in equipment in 1934 which
should have been of assistance to the operating authorities in the latter part of
the year.
24 carload represents the tonnage loaded in the average two-axle unit and
is computed by dividing tons originated by carloadings(in two-axle units).It
should not be confused with dynamic carload, which is computed by dividing net
ton-kilometers by loaded car-kilometers. The use of tariff ton-kilometers for com-
puting this will tend to show it in a poorer light than was actually true.
25Thatthe official data somewhat overstate the improved turnaround can be
argued from the data in Appendix A.
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trol—to assess the degree to which performance actually improved
in the year in question as a result of efforts to cope with the crisis.2 6
It is probable that the improvement was less startling than that on
record.Doubtless heavier maintenance expenditures beginning in
1933 must have contributed to these results, although it has not been
possible to pin down the evidence. Expansion in the numbers of
operating personnel is, however, apparent. These events may indicate
that the system had margin for improvement despite its apparently
hard-pressed condition in 1933, but the exact extent of improvement.
actually achieved remains unknown.
Nevertheless it is clear from Hunter's analysis that investment. in
the railroad sector had lagged and that an 18 per cent cut was imposed
in 1933 at a moment when the shortage of transport and its potential
effects should have been clearly apparent.27 Though congestion
appears to have been alleviated in large part by tightening perform-
ance, growth could only be resumed by .rectifying the proportions of
investment between transport and other industry. Without detailed
analysis of the impact of an enlarged railroad program by shape and
form breakdown and by component capacities,is: impossible to say
whether increased allocations could have been made for the required
rail items without imposing serious delay upon. the heavy industry
program. In 1934 and 1935 more favorable treatment was accorded
the railways, but thereafter, as the crisis was regarded as solved, much
emphasis was again placed upon tightening performance in order to
cope with steadily growing traffic, and performance factors generally
improved into 1937.
The year 1935 provides one of those interesting anomalies in the'
official Soviet account of events. Although performance had been.
improved in 1934, backlogs of unshipped freight had been reduced
either by movement or by local absorption, and an expansion of plant
and equipment through increased investment was already under way,
delayed reaction to the "crisis" resulted in the discredit of the railway
administration and the appointment of Lazar on February
28, 1935, as Minister of Transportation. The tenor of. the. official view
of the magic worked by his administration is indicated in Appendix
A.28 Analysis of the available data for 1935, however, tentatively
26Nodefinite evidence of statistical manipulation or changes in the basis of
reporting appears during these critical years, although there are known changes
in the basis of reporting certain data in other years.The concept of active
locomotive fleet, which has changed, appears to have remained stable in these years.
27SeeHunter, Soviet Transportation, p. 71.
28Seealso ibid., pp. 74-80. .
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suggests a considerable deception in the Soviet figures, particularly in
the calculated average car turnaround. For it appears probable that
the increase of freight cars in the fleet under railroad jurisdiction was
slightly understated in 1934 and considerably understated in 1935.
The understatement of the increase in the active or working fleet may
have been greater. Such an understatement of course makes the car
turnaround appear to have improved much more than may actually
have been the case. A series of calculations in Appendix A tentatively
assigns 69 per cent of the increased carloadings of 1935 to the increase
in the active freight car fleet and the remainder to an improvement
in car turnaround.
his notable that there was a significant increase in the production
of new locomotives in 1934 and a still greater one in 1935. Furthermore,
theFD type, which is the heaviest class of freight power in common use
on the Soviet railways and which has approximately 10 per cent more
tractive effort than class E, began to be produced in great quantity
in 1934 and represented slightly over one-third of 1935 production.
•Apart from 'their increased drawbar power, these locomotives were
also given larger driving wheels and more ample boilers, and hence
were capable of higher speeds in road service. The acquirement of
such a considerable number as 1,123 heavy freight locomotives in
1935 must have contributed to the faster clearance of yards and
improved road speed. Their concentration on the heavy traffic lines,
which may be presumed to have suffered the greatest congestion, must
have had a more beneficial effect than can be traced through the system
averages. The base was laid in 1935 for the improved performance of
the two subsequent years, and it is noteworthy that locomotive build-
ing remained 50 per cent above the 1932 level right through 1938.
Such evidence as we have suggests that improved traffic performance
should be attributed more to improvement of plant and equipment
than to any administrative legerdemain, despite the emphasis placed
on the latter in the Soviet literature.
The year 1938, however, saw a slight fall in carloadings and in
tons originated despite an increase in average carload. Revenue ton-
kilometers continued to grow as a result of increasing average haul,
but car 'turnaround was notably slower and to a degree which cannot
be accounted for by the increase in average haul alone. On the
average, shippers required two hours more for loading and unloading
than in the previous year, which had represented. an all-time record
for effective car handling; but the increase of delay in classification
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yards was more serious in its effects upon turnaround time.29 Empty
car-mileage again increased, but probably not for the same reasons as
in 1933. Inasmuch as line-haul movement seems to have been well
maintained, it is to the deterioration of work in classification yards,
as well as to the slower working of cars by shippers, that we must look
for an explanation of diminished loading capacity. No satisfactory
explanation appears, but the data bear the earmarks of lagging demand
for transportation.Railroads generally perform better under the
pressure of a traffic demand in excess of capacity to haul, other things
being equal, and utilization will necessarily fall if the pressure di-
minishes. The rate of growth of Soviet production, it appears, was
showing a tendency to slow down, and there may have been less severe
pressure on car turnaround.
The composition of traffic underwent interesting changes. While
coal, coke, petroleum, firewood, and grain originations increased, the
traffic in ores and in iron and steel and timber declined. Allowing for
the shift of a large tonnage out of the other freight category into
mineral building materials, it would appear that other freight suffered
a minor decline. The nature of these shifts would not suggest a
shortage of transportation capacity. Moreover, the monthly loading
data make clear that the modest decline in originations was well
spread through the spring and summer months. Somewhat of a
recovery appears to have begun in the fall and may conceivably have
been affected by relatively heavy grain movements.
Recovery in 1939 was marked, with a growth of approximately
8 per cent in tonnage originated and a smaller growth in ton-kilometers
because of a slight reduction in length of haul. Car turnaround
improved, but the more liberal supply of cars made it unnecessary to
achieve the very rapid movement of 1936 and 1937. Shippers' handling
of cars appeared to have established a new record and the movement
of cars through classification yards was fully restored to its earlier level.
Trainload, train speed, and average kilometers per active locomotive-
day all increased somewhat. There appears to be an unexplained
inconsistency in the Soviet data, however, for while train speed in-
creased and the average turnaround trip of a freight car declined
slightly, more time is reported to have been taken by the average car
in motion between terminals.30 Further improvement occurred in
1940, with approximately the same increase in tonnage originated.
It would appear, therefore, that on the eve of the war the Soviet
29Seeibid., Table 76, p. 409.
30 Seeseries C-31 in Appendix C and compare with Hunter, Soviet Transporta-
tion, Table 76, p. 409.
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railroads were in a strong position with adequate capacity for the
demands made up to that time, with a remarkably liquid freight
movement, and with well-developed techniques for handling mass
freight transportation under difficult weather conditions as well as
under favorable circumstances. The actual state of the railroads con-
trásted strongly with the low esteem in which they were generally held
in the Western world.
Freight Traffic Performance in War
The Soviet railway system manifestly proved adequate to support
massive and effective military operations. The means by which this
success can be judged are meager, for information on the war period
is largely lacking. As related to Soviet economic growth, the events of
the war years in terms of actual traffic and operating performance are
of limited significance. The losses sustained, the recovery therefrom,
the influence of foreign assistance, and the test afforded of operating
practices are not, however, without importance. In appraising them,
it is particularly necessary to bear in mind that the conditions en-
countered in the Soviet Union differed very sharply from those in
the United States and Great Britain, and even more sharply from
those in the area of Greater Germany. For the Soviet system contracted
and the wartime requirements developed on an industrial base which
was already operating in nearly as high a gear as possible. Not only
did the rail system contract with the loss of territory, but the industrial
base was also reduced by the loss of the intensively developed Donbas,
and the lines of communication to the armed forces were substantially
shortened for a significant portion of their requirements. Hence the
history of Russian wartime rail transport is altogether different from
that of the German rail system during the same period.
Soviet prewar opinion, as reflected in a number of the writings
which no doubt had been influenced by the "transportation crisis"
and by the experience of the first war, tended to forecast serious trans-
portation difficulties in the event of war. There was, however, con-
siderable prewar strengthening of the rail net by new construction
and its continuation during the war by the completion of lines of
strategic importance, particularly in support of Leningrad and Stalin-
grad, and of lines necessary to the expanding trans-Ural industrial base
and the opening up of alternative resources.31 There was, moreover,
the noteworthy wartime "compression" of operations, to use Hunter's
31Hunter,Soviet Transportation, Chapter 5.
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term: the decline of operated first main track from 95,526 kilometers32
in 1940 to 69,000 in 1942, the loss including the heavy-density network
of the Donbas, and the quite successful withdrawal of motive power
and rolling stock from the areas which came under German occupation..
This, of course, considerably increased the density of power and car
stock per kilometer of line for the remainder of the system and created
a surplus where tightness had been the historical experience. The
wartime traffic pattern, on the basis of the slim evidence available,
shows a relatively small direct military component and a decline in
total traffic considerably greater than 'the reduction of line operated.
This apparent Soviet experience checks with our own in the two wars.
It is, moreover, of large importance that the bulk of the lines lost
were in the heavy-density areas which, in the Soviet economy, compare
with our northeast, while the lines remaining in the operating system
more nearly resemble our light-density western lines.33 Hence system
traffic density declined, although many important routes carried much
heavier iraffic than previously, and required work in the way of con-
struction of auxiliary track to increase line capacity and the capacity
of yards and terminals. This phenomenon had something of a parallel
in the U.S. transcontinental routes because of the wartime growth of
west coast industry and the supply demands of the Pacific theatre.
Of the factors explaining the comparatively satisfactory wartime
performance of the Soviet rail system, the most important, of course,
is the contraction of the system and of the area served with the result-
ing surplus of power and equipment. Yet it is important to note• that
the great rollback of the German armies and the invasion of Germany
itself was adequately supported by a rail system which had to recon-
struct before it could operate in the recovered territory. As Hunter
emphasizes, however, the reconstruction was of lines required to
service the advancing armies as supply routes.Reconstruction for
economic purposes followed, as the rehabilitation of the occupied areas
got under way and was spread over a considerable period of time.34
32 Hunter's figure, which is theannualaverage.See series C
where the kilometrage for the expanded territory is given as 106,102 at the end
of 1940.
33 Garbutt estimates that the lines in occupied territory handled 40 per cent of
prewar Soviet traffic E. Garbutt, The Russian Railways, London, 1949, p. 22).
It appears quite possible that this is an understatement of the facts.
34 See Hunter, Soviet Transportation, pp. 102-104. The complaints of the Soviet
military, notwithstanding an apparently outstanding performance oftherail
authorities, are noted in Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, Glencoe,
Ill., 1953, note 40.Carloadings grew approximately 20 per cent in 1944, but only
11 per cent in 1945.It was not until 1949 that the prewar level of carloadings was
reached and passed.
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The statistical record of the war years is highly incomplete, hence
less can be learned of railroad operations than for prewar and postwar
years. The discussion which follows is offered not because the war
years shed any particular light on Soviet economic growth over the
long term, but rather because the ability to get through the war
successfully speaks well for the Soviet railroads, while the vast problem
of reconstruction which stood in the way of postwar recovery cannot
be understood without devoting some attention to the contraction and
destruction of the system.
The more intense working of the easterly lines of the Soviet system
required an increase in their capacity, as noted above, through the con-
struction of additional trackage and the improvement of signaling
and operating procedures. For a time, motive power and cars should
have presented no difficulty except for finding ample track storage for
surplus equipment. As the system's manufacturing and heavy repair
facilities had also been located on the lines which were now occupied,
even the ability to provide new equipment was temporarily lost, and
the surplus had to be traded on by increasing the bad-order ratio35
and, in time, cannibalizing unserviceable equipment. Shops were,
however, expanded on the eastern lines and the notable works at
Krasnoyarsk apparently were established by the evacuation of older
plants from the west.
Deliveries under U.S. Lend-Lease provide a clue to the problems
faced by the Soviet lines both in maintaining themselves in the later
stages of the war and in launching the westward extension of military
supply lines. These deliveries included sizable quantities of rail, frogs
and switches, block signal equipment (including the first centralized
traffic control panels and circuits used in the Soviet Union), portable
electric generating plants carried on railway cars, car wheels and axles,
air brake sets and other car specialties, and some 1,800 standard steam
locomotives (largely of the Decapod 2-10-0 type similar in capacity
and general features to the locomotives built for Imperial. Russia
during the first war, but equipped with certain modem specialties and
generally more satisfactory from a maintenance point of view), plus
a few electric and diesel units.
Brief consideration will make clear the need for these items. A good
part of Soviet capacity to roll rail had been lost. Considerable quan-
tities of material were needed to be able to lay yard and side track,
to carry out certain important line extensions, and to add second main
running track at points of congestion. Block signaling equipment was
35 The ratio of unserviceable cars to the total number of cars.
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badly needed in order to increase the capacity of lines which had
become congested by an unwonted flow of traffic.Centralized traffic
control served the same purpose, but the amount exported could only
provide a token installation on some selected segment of line. Certain
steel imports of standard shapes and forms may have provided some
underframe material for freight cars. Wood, a relatively abundant
commodity in the USSR, is heavily used for flooring and sheathing
many types of Soviet freight car.Indeed it may be said that the
composite car is still standard Soviet practice although it has seldom
been built in the United States since the middle Hence the
principal steel items required for new cars and heavy rebuilds would
have been underframes, wheels and axles, truck side frames37 and
bolsters, couplers, and other specialties. Of these, Lend-Lease provided
considerable quantities. Both the assembly of new and the heavy
repair of old cars can be carried out in the open at any suitable site
and with a minimum of equipment. The supply of specialty com-
ponents and of heavy steel shapes for the underframe is the principal
limitation.
The locomotives supplied under Lend-Lease were undoubtedly im-
portant in maintaining an ample supply. They were basically similar
to the light Decapods which had been extensively used in Russian
heavy freight service for a number of years. Simple and rugged in
design with relatively light moving parts, they were easy to maintain
with a minimum of back shop equipment38 and a labor force of small
mechanical skill. Moreover, even under Soviet conditions, they should
have been good for two or three years of service without heavy repair.
The testimony of one U.S. Transportation Corps mission which had
the opportunity to observe briefly rail operations behind the Soviet
lines indicates that the working stock was in part maintained by
ditching locomotives requiring heavy repair and replacing them with
new imported power.39 The unserviceable locomotives could then be
88Duringthe second war composite gondolas and hoppers were built in the U.S.
because of the shortage of steel plate.No box cars were permitted to be built
at that time.
37Considerableuse was still made of arch bar frames which could be fabricated
from small steel shapes.
88Thephraseback shop" refers to heavy repair facilities generally connected
with engine houses and widely distributed over the road.
39Motortrucks, which were provided under Lend-Lease in very large numbers,
appear to have been used in the same way and played a significant part in military
supply operations.It appears that in the late phases of the war, Soviet forces
operated at times from 200 to 400 miles in advance of railhead.Living off the
country, they depended at times upon trucks for ammunition and fuel.Never-
theless, major rail supply lines underwent remarkably rapid restoration and often
paced the movements of the front, resulting in the arrival of supply trains at
points still being fought over or under fire.
52SOViET RAiLROAD TRAFFiC
cannibalized to repair others. It is no doubt significant for an appraisal
of the Soviet shop position that, whereas components of freight cars
were imported, the demand in motive power was for complete assem-
bled locomotives shipped with the main rods down but otherwise
ready to run.
Soviet operating practices were well adapted to placing a heavy
traffic load on available railroad lines. Their prewar passenger time-
table showed a small volume of main-line intercity service. Even on
relatively important lines, only a few daily trains were scheduled and
the heaviest of such workings were in the territories now occupied by
the enemy. Under the exigencies of war, it may also be presumed that
little effort was made to hold to booked times when the pressure of
freight traffic was severe. And as fast passenger service was virtually
unknown, so also was fast freight service. Hence the sharp reduction
of line capacity occasioned by having one or more fast preferred trains
on the line was avoided. The slow pace of movement also permitted
relatively close headway, and where electric staff proved inadequate
for the press of traffic and block signaling was unavailable, a manual
block could be improvised by hand signaling. Where line capacity gov-
erned, a relatively even dispatchment of trains could be arranged over
the twenty-four hours. It is unwise to apply conclusions drawn from
Western experience to such basically different conditions.
In the movement westward, involving extension of the lines supply-
ing the armed forces, the contrast with Western methods was sharply
apparent and in part explains our wartime inability to believe that
the advancing Soviet armies were adequately supplied. It is first to be
noted that the daily supply requirement of a Soviet division was
substantially under the tonnage required by its Western counterpart
and that irregularities of supply, particularly of food, were accepted."'
But the most striking differences are in the methods by which a limited
open rail network was turned to account. Again the U.S. Transporta-
tion Corps mission sheds some light. Where possible a single-track
line would be paired with another lying cross-country, each line being
operated in a single direction, giving the effect of a double track.
Elsewhere on single tracks, groups of trains were sent in one direction
during a portion of the day in order to eliminate meets.41 Of the
40A most interesting, though brief, account of Soviet logistics is given in Garthoff,
Soviet Military Doctrine, pp. 290-294. The whole system of supply appears to have
been as haphazard as the rail movements up to railhead, and the notion of orderly
stocks at specified levels and in particular relationship to the front appears to have
been lacking.
41Bothof these methods have been employed elsewhere, but on a more
limited scale.
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greatest importance, forward depots with extensive rail trackage, yards,
and sidings were hardly required. For the Soviet technique was to
supply enough labor, conscripted from the countryside if need be, to
unload a full train simultaneously. and at a fast rate. •Hence it was
unnecessary either to break up trains at railhead or to provide extensive
trackage to hold cars, and the use of equipment was maximized.42
It is clear that Soviet railroad men had both skill and a spirit of
improvisation and their long training in high-pressure operations in
peacetime undoubtedly stood them in good stead.Their skill in
restoring destroyed or damaged trackage, bridges, etc.,is discussed
elsewhere.43
Reverting, however, to operations in the unoccupied areas, some
confirmation of the general pattern of performance can be gleaned
from the operating statistics.Carloadings and tonnage originated
had reached peaks in 1940, influenced somewhat by territorial acqui-
Both declined in 1941, but a sharp contraction to the war-
time low was marked in 1942 when carloadings stood at 43 per cent
of the 1940 high. Tonnage originated fell less rapidly, for there was
a marked increase in the average load per two-axle unit from 16.6 tons
in 1940 to 18.6 tons in 1942, and this increase continued the following
year.45 The contraction of operations to the east where the population
was less dense and distances greater was reflected in an increase in
average haul, although this was less noteworthy than might have been
expected, from 700 kilometers in 1940 to 786 in Hence the
fall in ton-kilometers was considerably less than that in carloadings.
The abundance of freight car equipment is confirmed by the decline
42Ofall measures rare in Western practice, this was undoubtedly the one of
most importance.
4SSeeHunter, Soviet Transportation) Chapter 5.Garbutt (Russian Railways,
p. 24)cites Soviet claims that the bridge over the Dnieper at Kiev, 1,100 meters
long, was replaced with a temporary structure in thirteen days and that a larger
structure was completed at Dnepropetrovsk intwenty-two days.Single-track
working was required for some time over the greater part of the restored system
and the replacement of temporary structures was spread over a considerable period
of time.On the other hand, a Soviet military complaint isrecorded to the
effect that restoration progressed at a tempo hardly faster than during the first
war, although track restoration up to twenty kilometers per day and more is
recorded (see Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, p. 292). The Soviet press, notably
Zheleznodorozhnyi transport [Railroad Transportation](issues of 1944 and 1945),
contains detailed accounts of very creditable performance in the face of heavy
destruction by the retreating enemy.Very heavy forces were evidently employed
to secure the simultaneous reconstruction of a large aggregate mileage.
441t should be observed that the eastern Polish lines acquired by the Soviet
Union represented the light-density portion of the Polish system.
series C-2, C-4, and C-S in Appendix C.
46 increases are estimated to have occurred in the following year, but a
decline appears to have been encountered in 1944 (see series C-3).
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in car-kilometers per active freight car-day from 139.9 in 1940 to
94.6 in 1942, while the average turnaround time from 7.37 days
to 13.8 days. The proposition that the trans-Ural industrial complex
required excessive empty car movements to balance equipment in the
face of unbalanced commodity flows is perhaps confirmed by the rapid
growth of empty car-kilometrage per freight car turnaround from
300 kilometers in 1940 to 385 in 1942 and 439 in 1943, although other
interpretations can be supplied to account in part for this phe-
nomenon.47 These operating statistics should not be viewed as the
result of a deterioration, much less of a breakdown,, in Soviet rail
performance. They are the natural result of a surplus of equipment,
congestion of lines and tenninals, and the slackening of effort in load-
ing and unloading which an abundance of cars makes possible.It
would appear that an expeditious adjustment had been made to
sharply changed conditions, aided in due course by the importation
of supplies from the West through the three primary gateways in the
rail system.
During the movement westward in 1943-45 the growth of operated
line was rapid, although much of the restoration was temporary and
did not include normal facilities for commercial traffic. Freight traffic
grew less rapidly than operated line, as is apparent from the percentage
relationships in Table 8.
TABLE 8
SOVIET FREIGHT TRAFFIC, 1942-45










1943 129 107 109 118
1944 176 130a 128a,b 131b
1945 179 145a 137a 138
SouRcE: Series C-34, C-4, C-2, and C-i in Appendix C.
a Average carload declined after 1943 and approximated the 1941 level in 1945.
b Average haul declined in 1945 and appears to have declined in 1944.In the
earlier year it still stood some 13 per cent above the prewar level.
It is well again to caution the reader that the material upon which
estimated operating and traffic data for the war years are based is
highly fragmentary. Nonetheless it is reasonably apparent that the
rapid restoration of first main track in liberated territory was not
matched by increase in traffic, particularly because the economy of
47Seeseries C-33.
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these areas was prostrate and large-scale economic reconstruction could
not get under way during the massive drive to the west.
Postwar Developments
Little expansion appears to have occurred in the postwar period,
for the 1953 network exceeded that of 1945 only by 7,000 kilometers
(see series C-35). Postwar reconstruction was devoted to restoring the
capacity of the reacquired network and subsequent efforts have been
in intensive development, such as improved signaling, lengthened
sidings, enlarged yards, the partial mechanization of yards, and
additional multiple tracking at certain bottleneck points. Indeed the
intensive development of the system since 1949 has been startling in
its effect. Whereas freight traffic density (ton-kilometers per kilometer
of road operated) more than doubled between 1933 and 1939, it now
increased by another 60 per cent in a brief six-year period (see series
C-36). The data in Table 9 show in summary form the return to
prewar traffic density and the subsequent expansion. A railroad system
TABLE 9
SOVIET TRAFEIC DENSLTY, 1939, 1945-54


















Prewar attained 1949 4,519 1954 7,134
SOURCE: Series C-36 in Appendix C.
a The period bears some resemblance to the intensive development of the U.S.
system during 1904-14, a matter which will be discussed further.But such com-
parisons should be approached with great caution.
faced with this type of situation must pursue a course of development
quite different from the one it would follow if it were growing largely
out of the conquest of new territory and the channeling of increased
density in the older areas over a few highly developed trunk lines.
Following 1946, operating ton-kilometers grew at an annual pace of
80 billion until 1952 when the increase was about 60 billion, a figure
which was approximated in each of the following two years. Not only
has growth not ceased, but the increase in operating ton-kilometers
was somewhat greater in 1954 than in the preceding year, and in 1955
the annual increase moved above 100 billion. As these are estimated
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by extrapolation of the divergence from tariff ton-kilometers which is
believed to be diminishing during recent years, the increase in tariff
ton-kilometers has been somewhat less, although it has followed the
same general pattern. Average length of haul reached a low of 712
kilometers in 1949, compared with 700 on the eve of war, and has
since gradually increased, as far as itis possible to estimate from
available data, reaching 757 kilometers in 1954 and 815 in 1957. The
latter level has been approximately maintained. In consequence, the
growth of tonnage originated has been slightly slower than that of
ton-kilometrage. Average carload (per two-axle unit), which declined
from the wartime level during the earlier restoration period, has since
been increasing and reached 19.8 tons in 1954;48 by 1960 it reached
21.5 tons. Hence growing traffic has not required an equivalent in-
crease in carloadings for its accommodation.49 Moreover, car turn-
around has improved every year since 1942 with the exception of
1954 and 1956; by 1953 it surpassed the best recordthe late 1930's,
and since then has been superior to any prewar performance. The
1959 datum represented a new record of 5.72 days.
While way and structures have undergone intensive development,
motive power and rolling stock have necessarily been increased in
numbers and the principal investments in railroads have gone into
these items. Although we have no direct data on the numbers of
locomotives or of cars owned or in service since 1940, the active fleets
can be calculated directly from the operating statistics. The active
freight car fleet reached a low of 576,000 two-axle units in 1945. The
1940 level of 721,200 units was exceeded in 1947 and since that time
growth has averaged 40,000 two-axle units per annum (see series C-26).
The aggregate carrying capacity of the active fleet would appear today
to be approximately double that of 1940 whereas the operating ton-
kilometers have multiplied by two and a third. Not only has the earlier
level of efficiency in car handling been regained—it has been sub-
stantially surpassed, and the required investment in rolling stock
48 It is of more than passing interest that average carload had increased 185
per cent since 1940, whereas the average capacity had increased but 15 per cent.
Another difference thus appears between the Soviet position and that of Western
coun tries where commercial practices tend to limit the advantage obtained from
increased unit capacity. The static load of 19.8 tons compares exceptionally favor-
ably with the average capacity of 24.1 tons in 1954.All of these data are in two-
axle units.
49 The qualification noted in discussing Soviet weight of lading practices should
be recalled.It is always possible that apparent trends in average load are the
result not of heavier actual loading but of an increase in the overstatement of
loading.
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accordingly limited.50 Yet we have no substantial evidence that the
pressure is excessive or that any significant shortage of rail capacity
has developed, although there have been warnings that such shortages
might again occur.If the exceptionally intensive utilization of all
elements of the rail plant in the late 1930's requires explanation, then
that of the period since 1950 is even more in need of explanation. In
part this will be accomplished through a subsequent study of the
operating statistics.But in part the explanation is to be found in
conditions extraneous to railroad operation and in policies established
for the governance of shippers and carriers alike. Attention will be
focused in Chapter 3 upon factors which affect the traffic—its volume,
composition, flow, and periodicity as a prelude to the discussion of
the operating statistics in Chapter 4. For the traffic conditions which
Soviet railroads face are fundamentally different from those which
'prevail in Western countries.
Railroad Passenger Traffic
Passenger operations have an effect upon the freight capacity of a
rail system and it is for this reason that a brief examination of these
operations seems useful.Not only has the automobile remained
'unavailable on any considerable scale, but very little intercity motor
bus service has been developed, except, as a very minor feeder to the
rail lines and as a token service between, a few of the larger cities in
the west. While progress has been made in commercial aviation, the
airplane has not become a mass carrier of passengers but serves largely
priority purposes on a limited scale and is of major significance only
on the long routes. Hence the railroad remains the principal means
of passenger transport save where steamer lines are available on
certain of the larger watercourses and in coastal waters.5'
Because of. this primary reliance upon railroads, Soviet rail passenger
traffic is large and its density over the thin route network of the
Soviet rail system is heavy. In comparison with the size of the country
and its population, however, even this large traffic suggests a relatively
immobile people.52 Moreover, as will become apparent, by far the
50Thepossibility of increasing deception in the data along the lines discussed
earlier must always be borne in mind, but it appears to us improbable that the
position relative to earlier years is materially overstated.
51Asixfold expansion of air passenger mileage by 1965 is planned which would
bring air passenger volume to some 20 billion and extend sub-
stantial relief to rail long-haul passenger services.
52Ifthe large use of the private automobile in the United States, which for many
years has accounted for more than 85 per cent of the intercity passenger movement,
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larger part of Soviet rail travel is short-haul commutation service
around the large metropolitan areas where the railroads serve more
nearly in the fashion of the British and Continental railroads than
like those in the United States, i.e., much that is done by automobile or
bus in this country is a steam railroad job in the Soviet Union and in
other countries.
Soviet passenger traffic stood at a low level in 1921/22, less than
half the prewar volume. Not until 1929 were the 1913 passenger-
kilometers surpassed. The restoration of freight traffic came first
and comparatively little was provided in the way of passenger train
accommodations, although trains were restored to punctuality, efforts
were made to clean up the equipment, and certain dining car services
were resumed, the latter largely for the effect upon morale. After
1923/24, the average length of passenger trip remained quite steady.
Between 1923/24 and 1929 long-distancepassenger traffic grew slightly
more than suburban traffic, although the latter stood in 1929 at
approximately two and a third times the volume of 1923/24(see
series C-12 and C-15).
The early 1930's saw a remarkable growth in passenger travel.
Between 1929 and 1932 long-distance traffic more than doubled, while
suburban traffic came close to quadrupling. The relationship of this
growth to urbanization will be apparent. Soviet passenger traffic in
1930 surpassed that of Class I railroads of .the United States for the
first time, and by 1931 it had exceeded the all-time high of American
rail passenger traffic, which had been attained in 1923. The U.S.
roads, under the influence of the automobile and the bus, had had
steadily declining passenger traffic since that year and the rate of
decline increased after the fall of 1929. It is of interest to note that
Soviet commutation traffic in 1930 was approximately equal to that
in the United States, but thereafter shot up rapidly while the U.S.
traffic declined.
The years 1933-36 were marked by a lower level of passenger traffic,
and the 1932 level was not attained again until 1937. The decline
was almost entirely in long-distance traffic, for commutation traffic
held quite steady during these years and showed some growth in 1936.
is ignored, we must reckon some 117 billion annual passenger-kilometers in recent
years by the three principal modes of intercity commercial passenger transport,
whereas the Soviet rail traffic is believed to have approximated 107 billion pas-
senger-kilometers in 1952, for a population one-fifth larger than the American one.
By 1959 the Soviet passenger-kilometers had grown to 164.4 billion by rail and
approximately 170 billion by all forms of transport.Per capita use of mass trans-
port would thus appear to have run above current figures for the U.S.
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This performance is probably related to the development of the trans-
portation crisis of the 1930's, for the priority necessary for freight
service and the general shortage of line capacity no doubt prevented
an increase in passenger service, which under other circumstances
might have been undertaken. Indeed it appears that long-distance
passenger services were curtailed in the interest of relieving freight
congestion.
Soviet passenger service has, however, never been the embarrassment
to freight service that is characteristic of competitive service elsewhere.
As the timetables reveal, the service is infrequent, the majority of
trains are local or accommodation trains, and booked speeds are low.53
While rail passenger service is a necessity, there is no competitive
stimulus to produce a multiplicity of lightly loaded fast trains nor is
there occasion for the duplication of train service. The passenger
service appears to be arranged more for the operating convenience of
the railroad than for the convenience of the passenger. Few trains
approach 30 m.p.h. in their speed, and only between Moscow and
Leningrad is something approaching an express passenger service
operated.54 Over most lines a very limited number of heavy slow
trains operate, affording minimum interference to the freight traffic
which is accorded primary importance.
Between 1936 and the beginning of the war, the growth of passenger
traffic was resumed, but at a moderate rate.' From 90.9 billion pas-
senger-kilometers in 1937, a prewar peak of 98.0 billion was achieved
in 1940, but much of the increase must be attributed to enlargement
of the rail system by territorial acquisition. Approximately half the
total growth in these years was accounted for by the expansion of
suburban traffic.Soviet long-distance traffic within the old territorial
limits can hardly have grown significantly. At the end of the period,
however, commutation traffic stood at 2.4 times the maximum volume
ever attained in the United States. The average trip in commutation
service has remained remarkably steady and is approximately the
same as the U.S. figure. It would appear that an excellent job is done
in handling intensive commuter loads although the standards of
comfort and crowding leave much to be desired.
53Thelatest timetables to reach the United States are for 1959.See Ukazatel'
zheleznodorozhnykh pa.ssazhirskikh soobshchenii leto 1959 goda [Railroad Passenger
Timetables for the Summer of 1959], Moscow, 1959.
84Hunter,Soviet Transportation, Chapter 10, affords some comparison of various
routes and years which are representative of the better long-distance services.It is
recently reported that the Moscow-Leningrad service has been accelerated to six
hours and twenty minutes, requiring an average speed of 63.7 m.p.h.(Trains,
June 1961, p.
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The war years in passenger traffic, as in much else, are a blank.
The 1945 volume, however, stood at approximately two-thirds that of
1940, the decline having been about the same in the suburban and
long-distance services. The volume in 1946 approached the 1940
volume, apparently as the result of nonrecurring mass movements
which affected primarily the long-distance services, although a bit of
a bulge is also observable in the commuter traffic and the latter did
not attain the prewar level until 1951. Schedule timings were, however,
much slower than in prewar years and, although improved, remained
inferior as late as 1949. A slight decline in total passenger travel for
1947 was followed by a precipitate decline in 1948. A return to the
prewar level wasachieved in 1951 and a steady, but moderate, increase
occurred during subsequent years. The Soviet railways are, no doubt,
now the largest passenger-carrying system in the world, having sur-
passed the British, while the German system has been cut in two parts.
In number of passengers carried, the Soviet system still falls below the
prewar German system, but its average haul in the long-distance
services far exceeds the German performance. At present there is much
to indicate progress in improving the quality of passenger service—
transition to the all-steel car, improvement of appointments in the
coaching stock and acceleration of certain services.
The selected data in Table 10 illustrate the position in recent years.
TABLE 10











1951 214,300 1,101,000 73,400 25,100
1953 229,300 1,275,000 89,400 28,900
1955 249,400 1,392,000 109,100
1957 248,000 1,506,000 118,700 34,700
SOURCE: Series C-12, C-IL C-15, and C.16.
It will be noted that the number of long-distance passengers had
declined from the 340.4 million reached in 1940. Nor had the level
returned to that of 1945 as late as 1959.Nevertheless, passenger-
kilometers. in the long-distance service increased and by 1951 exceeded
the prewar level. The average trip of long-distance passengers grew
fromto 479 kilometers in the period covered by the table and thus
stands some 120 per cent above the prewar datum. The restrained
growth of long-distance trips in recent years is no doubt traceable in
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part to the gradual shift of official and business travel to the airline
services, although nothing approaching in volume the comparable
shift in the United States has yet occurred.
No factor is of greater importance in permitting the development
of a very large passenger business with a limited train mileage than
the lack of standards of public service and the absence of any competi-
tive pressure, which permit a load factor far in excess of anything
achieved in Western countries and avoid the necessity of operating
train services that the available volume of traffic will not justify. For
in the Soviet system traffic is allowed to press upon the service and,
whereas in the United States passenger load factors55 are not much
above 25 per cent for the service as a whole, the Soviet factors must
be supposed to lie in the 80's if not higher for the long-distance services.
On an equivalent load factor the train service operated in the United
States might be expected to handle three times the present passenger-
mileage and roughly this expansion occurred during the latter part
of the war. To the load factor may be added the tendency to move the
bulk of the traffic in cars equipped with wooden benches and arranged
for high-seating density, the infrequency of the train service, and the
heavy trainloads. If the Soviet freight service is reminiscent of Amer-
ican conditions in the first quarter of the present century, the passenger
service recalls that of Western European countries during the same
period minus the fast express services.56 Few operating data are,
however, available and further analysis would be relatively un-
productive.
55 Passenger-miles as a percentage of seat-miles operated.
56 Load factors may, indeed, be higher than suggested above.Moreover, it seems
probable that, at least in the first postwar decade, the volume of passenger traffic
was restrained by the limitation of service.Edward Crankshaw notes that, "For
years it was impossible, without the necessary blat, to get a railway ticket from Kiev
to Kharkov," and he defines blat as a "peculiarly Russian mixture of spivvery and
graft"(Khrushchev's Russia, Baltimore, 1959, P. 73).The recent U.S. railway
mission to Russia reports that "they permit passengers to ride on top of trains, even
in electrified territory with catenary, and through tunnels" (Railway Age, August
1960, p. 14). The same group reports that people wait in stations for perhaps two
days at a time during peak travel seasons trying to board a train (Traffic World,
August 6, 1960).
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